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You Promised You Wouldn't Tell:
Modifying Arbitration Confidentiality
Agreements to Allow Third-Party
Access to Prior Arbitration
Documents
Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
To facilitate the speed, cost-effectiveness, and casual atmosphere2 of arbitra-
tion, it has long been thought that parties must trade in the usual features of the
courts, such as precedent, appellate review, and certain evidentiary rules. With
the increasing use of arbitration, many parties have begun to demand that some of
the comforts that have long accompanied litigation be merged with the benefits of
arbitration. Courts have, for the most part, denied such demands. Nevertheless,
the Seventh Circuit in Gotham Holdings allowed such a demand by ruling that
third parties must have the opportunity to obtain prior arbitration awards and use
them as evidence of precedent in a subsequent arbitral or judicial proceeding.
Any concern that arbitration will lose its appeal, as such a procedure will drive up
the cost for arbitration and bring arbitration closer to being like litigation, is mis-
guided. Providing information about prior arbitral awards and related documents
offers precedential value and will only lead to a faster and more cost-effective
process. Similarly, giving parties the opportunity to offer evidence and testimony
other than their own voice will allow them to provide better support for their
claims and permit arbitration to become even more of a "necessary legal reme-
dy."3
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2005, Health Grades Incorporated (Health Grades) entered into a contract
with Hewitt Associates LLC (Hewitt). Health Grades was to develop online ap-
plications for Hewitt's clients to allow the clients' access to specific health care
1. 580 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2009).
2. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-542,
at 13 (1982)); see also S. REP. No. 536, at 3 (1924).
3. Teamsters Nat'1 Auto. Transporters Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. Troha, 328 F.3d 325, 330 (7th
Cir. 2003).
1
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information provided by Health Grades.4 The contract contained an arbitration
confidentiality agreement.5 This agreement stated that "[a]ll aspects of the arbitra-
tion shall be treated as confidential. Neither the parties nor the arbitrators may
disclose the existence, content or results of the arbitration, except as necessary to
comply with legal or regulatory requirements." 6
Unfortunately, in 2006, a dispute arose between Health Grades and Hewitt,
which resulted in arbitration before an American Arbitration Association (AAA)
panel.7 Pursuant to this arbitration, the parties entered into a Stipulated Protective
Order and Confidentiality Agreement (Stipulated Protective Order), which re-
quired the parties to destroy any confidential documents within forty-five days
after the entry of final judgment. However, unbeknownst to Health Grades, as
argued in their appellate brief, Hewitt did not destroy the confidential documents.9
At the same time Health Grades was engaged in arbitration with Hewitt, Go-
tham Holdings, LP (Gotham Holdings) filed suit against Health Grades in the
Southern District of New York.' 0 Gotham Holdings then served Hewitt with a
subpoena in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois," seeking to
obtain the confidential documents from the arbitration between Hewitt and Health
Grades.12 While Hewitt did not object to disclosing the documents, Health Grades
moved to quash the subpoena when it ultimately learned that Hewitt did not de-
stroy the confidential, arbitration documents.13 Health Grades argued that because
of the strong, federal policy favoring arbitration, the court must enforce the arbi-
tration confidentiality agreement agreed to by the parties and not allow a third-
party to obtain these confidential documents, which, according to Health Grades,
should have been destroyed pursuant to the Stipulated Protective Order.14
However, because Health Grades was unable to produce a copy of the Stipu-
lated Protective Order between Hewitt and Health Grades, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois rejected Health Grades' claims and enforced the
subpoena against Hewitt. This resulted in Health Grades' appeal.'5 Unfortunately
for Health Grades, the Seventh Circuit also rejected Health Grades' assertions,
finding that absent a specific privilege, arbitration confidentiality agreements pro-
tect solely against voluntary disclosures made by the parties to the agreement, not
to third parties who have a legal right of access to the documents, such as through
a subpoena.' 6
4. Opening Brief and Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant, Health Grades, Inc.,
Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d 664 (2009) (No. 09-2377), 2009 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 186, at *10.
5. Id. at *7.
6. Id. at *l0-*ll.
7. Id. at *11.
8. Id. at *7. Final judgment was entered on June 4, 2007. Id.
9. Gotham Holdings, 2009 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 186, at *8.
10. Id. at *9.
11. This is where Hewitt's principal place of business is located. Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d at
665.
12. Gotham Holdings, 2009 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 186, at *5-*6.
13. Id. at *8-*9.
14. Id. at *20-*21.
15. Gotham Holdings LP v. Health Grades, Inc., 580 F.3d 664, 665 (7th Cir. 2009). The District
Court issued a stay pending Health Grades' appeal. Id.
16. Id. at 666.
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III. LEGAL HISTORY
A federal policy in favor of arbitration began to take shape in the Supreme
Court's 1967 decision, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp." In
Prima Paint, one party alleged that the entire contract, including the arbitration
agreement, had been induced by fraud and thus filed suit in the Southern District
of New York.' 8 However, the other party moved to arbitrate the fraud claim pur-
suant to the arbitration agreement contained in the contract, despite the fact that
the entire contract was alleged to be fraudulent.19 In response, the Court found
that the issue of fraudulent inducement to contract was in itself an arbitrable
claim. 20
In interpreting section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),21 the Court
found that arbitration should be ordered "once it is satisfied that the making of the
agreement for arbitration ... is not in issue."22 Therefore, the Court concluded
that a federal court may only hear a claim of fraud pertaining to the arbitration
23
agreement itself, not a general claim of fraud relating to the entire contract.
Such a claim must be heard in arbitration.24
Since Prima Paint, the courts of appeals have consistently held that "[federal
law requires that] questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy re-
gard for the federal policy favoring arbitration."25 Moreover, in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. the Court interpreted section 2
of the FAA 26 as creating a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration" the effect of
which "is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to
any arbitration within the coverage of the Act."27 This requires that any concerns
relating to the arbitrability of certain issues "and ambiguities as to the scope of the
arbitration clause itself [be] resolved in favor of arbitration." 28 This federal policy
in favor of arbitration is merely to guarantee that arbitration agreements are en-
forced according to their own terms.29
17. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
18. Id. at 398.
19. Id. at 399.
20. Id at 403-04.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
22. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).
23. Id. at 404.
24. Id
25. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
26. 9 U.S.C. § 2, reads:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
27. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
28. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76
(1989).
29. Id. at 476.
No. 2] 465
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A. Enforcing Confidentiality Agreements
In Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Electric Works, Ltd., the Seventh Circuit began to
tackle the issue of enforceability of confidentiality agreements when it first faced
such an issue in the area of litigation.3 0 In Jepson, Makita Electric Works, Ltd.
(Makita) was involved in an anti-trust action with Jepson, Inc.31 As a result of this
litigation, Makita deposed a representative of Black & Decker Corp. (Black &
Decker) for the purpose of obtaining information relating to the United States
power tools market.3  Prior to the deposition, Makita and Black & Decker agreed
to a Stipulated Protective Order (SPO), making the information disclosed in the
deposition confidential.33
Later, Black & Decker filed a claim with the International Trade Commission
(ITC) alleging that Makita was selling professional power tools in the U.S. market
at less than fair market value in violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1673.34 During the ITC
proceedings, a president of Black & Decker gave testimony which Makita be-
lieved was contrary to Black & Decker's earlier deposition.35  After the presi-
dent's testimony, Makita's counsel offered to provide evidence of the previous
deposition with Black & Decker, but in so doing Makita's counsel gave a brief
description of the deposition. 36 In response, Black & Decker alleged that such a
description violated the SPO and it moved to enforce the SPO and sanction Maki-
ta for describing the deposition.37
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court may issue a pro-
tective order only by a showing of "good cause," something that was not found by
the district court. Even if both parties agree to a protective order, the district
court must make an independent showing of "good cause"39 as such information
in future cases may ease "the tasks of courts and litigants, and [speed] up what
may otherwise be a lengthy [discovery] process."40 Furthermore, a refusal to
modify an SPO to force a party to disclose relevant information often subsequent-
ly results in wasteful, duplicate discovery as such initial disclosure from the mod-
ification of the SPO may have resulted in the disclosure of relevant information.4
However, duplication of discovery is necessary when such information may
"tangibly prejudice substantial rights of the party opposing modification."42
30. 30 F.3d 854 (7th Cit. 1994), rev'g, 143 F.R.D. 657 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
31. Id. at 855.
32. Id
33. Id. at 856.
34. Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006).
35. Jepson, Inc., 30 F.3d at 856.
36. Id. at 856-57.
37. Id. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois "granted Black & Decker's motion
and sanctioned Makita's counsel $5,000" and Makita appealed. Id. (citing Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec.
Works, Ltd., 143 F.R.D. 657 (N.D. Ill. 1992), rev'd, 30 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 1994)).
38. Jepson, Inc., 30 F.3d at 859.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 861 (citing Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980), superseded by
rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) (2000 amendment), as recognized in Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1068
(7th Cir. 2009).
41. Id. at 861.
42. Id at 858 (quoting Wilk, 635 F.2d at 1299).
466 [Vol. 2010
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Additionally, in Baxter International, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories,43 the Se-
venth Circuit added additional requirements for confidentiality agreements in
litigation by stating that "a litigant must do more than just identify a kind of in-
formation and demand secrecy ... ."" A party cannot demand that a document be
kept confidential solely by claiming that "the agreement is, by its terms, confiden-
tial."45 The party must "analyze in detail, document by document, the propriety of
secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations.""
Thus, the court found that, in spite of any previous agreement, documents that
are crucial to the decision in any litigation must be made available to the public.47
"Only trade-secrets, information covered by a recognized privilege . . . and infor-
mation required by statute" are to remain confidential and struck from the public
record.48 Likewise, the court found that a party does not have the right to keep
third parties from learning the nature of the litigation. 49 The court offered an al-
ternative to the openness of litigation by stating that if a party desires complete
confidentiality, that party should turn to arbitration.50
B. Subpoenas and Arbitration
The Seventh Circuit first faced the relationship between subpoenas and arbi-
tration in Teamsters Negotiating Committee v. Troha, which involved a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA)." In Troha, the union sought to enforce an arbitra-
tion subpoena against a non-signatory third-party to the CBA, which contained the
arbitration agreement.52 In response to the enforcement action in district court, the
third-party alleged that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)," because unlike section
133 1,54 which allows for any suit "arising under the laws of the United States,"
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the district court, "[u]pon motion by a
party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown ... [the court
may] make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following: ...
(7) that a trade-secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way. . .
Jepson, 30 F.3d at 858.
43. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbot Lab., 297 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2002).
44. Id at 546 (citing Composite Marine Propellers Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1266).
45. Id. at 547.
46. Id at 548.
47. Id at 546. ("[S]tudents of the judicial system are entitled to know what the heavy financial
subsidy of litigation is producing."). Information that is "vital to claims made in litigation ... must be
revealed." Id. at 547.
48. Id.
49. Baxter, 297 F.3d at 548.
50. Id. ("Baxter, whose refusal to accept the result of the arbitration is the cause of the current prob-
lem, has no claim to keep a lid on its own documents .... It had, and spurned, a sure path to dispute
resolution with complete confidentiality: accept the result of the closed arbitration."); see also Union
Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) ("People who want secrecy should opt for
arbitration.").
51. 328 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 2003).
52. Id. at 327.
53. Labor Management Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. 185(a) (2006).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(a) (2006).
No. 2] 467
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section 301 only allows "suits for violations of contracts."ss Thus, the third-party
argued that a court only has jurisdiction under section 301 over the parties to the
CBA, as they are the only ones who are capable of violating such a contract. 56
The Seventh Circuit agreed that no jurisdiction existed under section 301, as
such a rule had been firmly established by the Supreme Court only a few years
earlier.57 However, the court found that jurisdiction was proper under section
1331, because "when the purpose of the lawsuit effectuates the goals of section
301 . .. it is appropriate for federal common law to embrace such suits."58 The
court found that the lawsuit effectuated the goal of section 301, because the reason
the union needed the information from the third-party was to prove that the other
party had in fact breached the CBA.59
The court explained that the reason for such a ruling is that arbitration "can-
not provide the 'necessary legal remedy' if the parties to the arbitration have no
means of securing valuable evidence other than their own testimony."6o Further,
enforcement of a CBA is powerless if the parties "cannot present evidence in the
form of third person testimony or documents possessed by third parties."6' More-
over, moving to enforce an arbitration subpoena has a great effect on the arbitra-
tion process and is necessary to effectuate the purpose of agreeing to arbitrate in
the first place.62
1. Third Parties Using Subpoenas to Obtain Prior Arbitration Documents
Moving from subpoenas issued in arbitration to subpoenas seeking the
records of a prior arbitration, the Eastern District of New York established, in
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cunningham Lindsey Claims Mgmt., Inc. ,63 that a
previous arbitration award may be discoverable if it is relevant to the current pro-
ceeding.M In Cunningham Lindsey, the plaintiff sued the defendant for negligence
and sought to obtain the records from a very similar claim between the defendant
and a third-party that went to arbitration. In response, the defendant claimed that
the prior arbitration award was protected by a confidentiality agreement and that
parties who have chosen to pursue arbitration must have their "expectations of
confidentiality" respected.66
55. Teamsters Nat'l Auto. Transporters Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. Troha, 328 F.3d 325, 327-28
(7th Cir. 2003); see also Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div., Avco Corp. v. UAW, 523 U.S.
653, 656 (1998).
56. Troha, 328 F.3d at 329.
57. See Textron, 523 U.S. 653, 661-62 (1998).
58. Troha, 328 F.3d at 330; see Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S.
448, 455 (1957).
59. Troha, 328 F.3d at 329.
60. Id. at 330.
6 1. Id.
62. Id. ("It is therefore appropriate to apply the reach of federal common law to ensure that such
subpoenas do not go unenforced.").
63. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cunningham Lindsey Claims Mgmt., Inc., No. 03CV0531 (DLI)
(MLO), 03CV1625 (DLI) (MLO), 2005 WL 1522783 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005) (mem.).
64. Id. at *3 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
65. Id. at * I.
66. Cunningham Lindsey, 2005 WL 1522783, at *3.
[Vol. 2010468
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Faced with a confidentiality agreement, the court recognized that such agree-
ments must be protected as they advance "federal policy and [encourage] ADR by
ensuring that parties in an arbitration proceeding get the protections for which
they contracted." 67 The court found that this federal policy favoring ADR, chiefly
arbitration, was established by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 199868
and the FAA. In recognition of this policy favoring arbitration and the confiden-
tiality of such proceedings, the court acknowledged that "[a]n overzealous quest
for ADR" may end up "suppressing admissible evidence in the name of confiden-
tiality" and not grant a litigant "the opportunity to . . . discover information in
support of its case."70
Realizing the balance between protecting confidentiality provided by ADR
and protecting admissible evidence, the court looked to an established rule in the
Second Circuit asserting that there is a presumption that the terms and monetary
amount of a settlement agreement made pursuant to litigation are not discoverable,
"absent extraordinary circumstances or a compelling need."7  Applying this rule
to the arbitral setting, the court established that arbitration awards are discovera-
ble, but in order for a party to obtain the terms and monetary value of an arbitra-
tion award, it must show that "the information sought is compelling enough to
outweigh the privacy interests that are involved." 72
In a very similar situation to Cunningham Lindsey and Gotham Holdings, the
Federal District Court of Colorado recognized the cost-effectiveness of enforcing
third-party subpoenas in Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Interna-
tional, Inc.73 In Jaffe, the court held that unless substantial prejudice is shown,
"policy considerations favoring the efficient resolution of disputes justify modifi-
cation" of the confidentiality agreement so that costly duplication of discovery is
avoided.74 The court continued its support of efficient dispute resolution by stat-
ing that even if substantial prejudice is shown, a "court has broad discretion in
determining whether the injury outweighs the benefits of modification."75
67. Id. at *3.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 651 (2006).
69. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006); Cunningham Lindsey, 2005 WL 1522783, at
*3.
70. Cunningham Lindsey, 2005 WL 1522783, at *3 (citation omitted).
71. Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 144 n.8 (2nd Cir. 2004) (citing Martindell v. Int'l
Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 296-97 (2nd Cir. 1979)).
72. Cunningham Lindsey, 2005 WL 1522783, at *4; see also Hasbrouck v. BankAmerica Hous.
Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 458-59 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
Settlement of claims without judicial intervention contrasted with public interest in an open judi-
cial system implicate public policy interests. Public policy interests in the speedy resolution of
conflicts and judicial efficiency are involved. There may be a countervailing public interest in
open discovery in support of a claim or defense. Finally, the defendants have a private interest in
full discovery of infonnation relating to defending their claim.
Id.
73. No. Civ.A. 04-N-1228 (CBS, 04-X-0057), 2004 WL 1821968 (Dist. Colo. Aug. 13, 2004).
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2. Restricting Disclosure to Third Parties to Certain Situations
Not all courts have been so supportive of the free flow of information from
prior arbitrations to third parties. In Malibu Consulting Corp. v. Funair Corp., the
Western District of Texas found that documents specifically protected by a confi-
dentiality agreement may not be disclosed to third parties. Nonetheless, the
court held that the documents sought by the third-party in that particular instance
should be disclosed for two reasons. 7 First, the SPO only protected "confidential
information," which was not the type of information sought by the third-party.
Second, the SPO provided that upon completion of the arbitration, all confidential
information must be returned to the parties.7 9 Thus, even if confidential informa-
tion was disclosed to the third-party, it would only be confidential information
possessed by the party facing the subpoena, therefore, negating any breach of the
SPO.s 0
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit in ITT Educational Services, Inc. v. Arce, held
that a prior arbitration decision may be discoverable, but not in all situations.8 ' In
Arce, a group of students went to arbitration over a dispute pursuant to their
enrollment agreement with ITT Educational Services, Inc. (ITT).82 After the
group received a favorable ruling, a student who retained the same counsel as the
first group chose to arbitrate the same claim a year later using much of the same
evidence and findings from the previous arbitration.83 In response, ITT sought to
permanently enjoin the group of students from disclosing the documents of the
prior arbitration to the individual student, arguing that such disclosure would vi-
olate the confidentiality agreement.84
After the district court granted the permanent injunction sought by ITT, the
students alleged that ITT had failed to show that any irreparable injury would
occur and that invoking the confidentiality agreement to conceal evidence of
wrongdoing from the second arbitration violated public policy.85 In response, the
Fifth Circuit found that ITT actually would suffer an irreparable injury as "there is
'no cure for the breach of the confidentiality agreement"' and, as such, that infor-
76. Malibu Consulting Corp. v. Funair Corp., No. SA-06-CV-735-XR, 2007 WL 173668, at *5
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2007).
77. Id. at *4.
78. Id.
79. Id.; Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc, No. Civ.A. 04-N-1228 (CBS, 04-X-
0057), 2004 WL 1821968 (Dist. Colo. Aug. 13,2004).
80. Funair Corp., 2007 WL 173668, at *4; see also Jaffe, 2004 WL 1821968.
81. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Arce, 533 F.3d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
82. Id at 344.
83. Id.
84. Id
85. Arce, 533 F.3d at 347.
To obtain permanent injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate: '(1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate
to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be dis-
served by a permanent injunction.
Id. (quoting eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
470 [Vol. 2010
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mation could be used against ITT, not only in the second arbitration, but in count-
less others as well.
Regarding the students' claims that the student in the second arbitration
would be at a disadvantage by not being able to prove his case, the court found
that he would not be burdened, as he would still be free to make his case, just
without the documents from the prior arbitration.8 7 He would be in the same posi-
tion as any other litigant who must start at square one and without confidential
information, not otherwise discoverable, to prove their case.8
In response to the students' assertion that denying prospective students know-
ledge of the arbitrator's findings would violate public policy, the court cited Iberia
Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC," which stated "[i]f arbitration were
required to produce a publicly available, 'precedential' decision . . . one would
expect that parties contemplating arbitration would demand . .. all of the proce-
dural accoutrements that accompany a judicial proceeding."9 ' Further, the inten-
tion of arbitration "is that one 'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of
the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration."' 92
Notwithstanding different circuit interpretations, such an emphatic denial by
the Fifth Circuit of a party's ability to use a prior arbitration award to its advan-
tage seemed to shut the door for one to use a prior decision as evidence of
precedent. However, these cases involved parties who were signatories to the
confidentiality agreement and who desired to voluntarily disclose the arbitration
decision without facing a subpoena. Nevertheless, the effect on a party to the
confidentiality agreement who received a subpoena by a third-party was unknown
until the Seventh Circuit ruled on this matter in Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health
Grades, Inc."
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Gotham Holdings, the court first noted that the confidentiality agreement
between Health Grades and Hewitt specifically allowed for the materials from the
arbitration to be disclosed when faced with a subpoena. 94 However, the court
found that such information would still have to be disclosed even if explicit lan-
guage was included in the agreement that would have blocked disclosure in the
face of a subpoena.95
The court found that contracts "bind only the parties" and the rights of a
third-party "may be affected only with their consent." 6 Additionally, by citing its
ruling in Troha, the court stated that it would be strange to treat arbitration sub-
86. Id. at 347 (quoting Toon v. Wackenhut Corrs. Corp., 250 F.3d 950, 954 (5th Cir. 2001)).
87. Id.
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
89. Arce, 533 F.3d at 347.
90. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 159 (5th Cir. 2006).
91. Id. at 175-76.
92. Id. at 176 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
93. 580 F.3d 664.
94. Id. at 665.
95. Id
96. Id. at 665-66.
No. 2] 471
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poenas as a "one-way street" in the sense that parties to an arbitration may forci-
bly obtain information through a subpoena, but may not divulge that information
when they themselves are faced with a subpoena. 97
As an additional point, the court noted that there is no federal policy favoring
arbitration.98 The FAA merely eliminated hostility to ADR and placed "arbitra-
tion agreements upon the same footing as others contracts."99 If there is such a
policy favoring arbitration, then that "policy is simply to ensure the enforceability,
according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate."'" The court con-
cluded by noting that arbitration agreements are enforced just like any other con-
tract and any federal policy in favor of arbitration is simply a policy in favor of
contracts in general.1o
Moreover, in reference to ITT Educational Services, Inc. v. Arce,102 the court
agreed with the Fifth Circuit's holding that a party to an arbitration confidentiality
agreement must "not voluntarily disclose any information related to the arbitra-
tion." 03 The court recognized that the key is that the party would not voluntarily
disclose the information, not that the party would not disclose the information
when a third-party "had a legal right of access," such as through a subpoena.1
In addition, the court recited the rule in Baxter International that in litigation,
one's "[preference] for secrecy does not create a legal bar to disclosure."' In
reference to this rule, the court established that the same conclusion should be
reached for arbitration confidentiality agreements, and that only trade-secrets,
privileges, and statutes or rules requiring confidentiality should impede one's
access to that information.'"
V. COMMENT
The Seventh Circuit in Gotham Holdings may not have been the first to hold
that, notwithstanding the confidentiality agreement, the prior arbitration decision
must be disclosed to the third-party. 07 Nevertheless, it is an important decision as
it is one of the first federal circuit courts to make such a ruling. Moreover, it is an
important decision in the sense that increased disclosure of prior arbitration
awards and documents may force courts and parties to reassess the pervasive be-
lief that arbitration must be accompanied with limited procedure.
97. Id. at 666.
98. Id.
99. Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d at 666 (quoting Arthur Andersen, LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896,
1901 (2009)).
100. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)).
101. Id.
102. 533 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 2008).
103. Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d at 665 (citing ITT Educ. Ser's., Inc. v. Arce, 533 F.3d 342, 347-48
(5th Cir. 2008)) (emphasis in original) (alteration in original).
104. Id at 665-66. "That's what T 6 of this agreement does: The parties promised to keep their
mouths (and files) shut unless a subpoena required a turnover." Id. at 666.
105. Id. at 665 (citing Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbot Lab., 297 F.3d 544, 544 (7th Cir. 2002)).
106. Id (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii)).
107. The District of Colorado made a similar ruling in Jaffe. See Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v.
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A. The Stipulated Protective Order Entered into by Health Grades Clearly
Allowed the Information to be Disclosed
In analyzing the court's decision, the court was correct to find that the infor-
mation sought by Gotham Holdings from Hewitt was not protected by the SPO
that was entered into between Hewitt and Health Grades. 08 The SPO specifically
stated that a party may disclose information that would otherwise be protected in
order "to comply with legal or regulatory requirements."' 09 As a subpoena is a
legal requirement, Hewitt was permitted under the SPO to disclose the arbitration
documents to Gotham Holdings. As the court noted, Hewitt and Health Grades
simply "promised to keep their mouths ... shut unless a subpoena required a turn-
over.""10
However, it is worth noting that perhaps the documents in Hewitt's posses-
sion should not have even existed in the first place. Health Grades argued that the
SPO required all confidential information to be destroyed within forty-five days of
the completion of the arbitration proceedings.'" In response, the court remained
silent in regards to Health Grades' assertion.112 The court was likely hesitant to
rule that one could destroy confidential documents when faced with required dis-
closure.
Additionally, the SPO may have been modified by the district court so as to
make the forty-five day provision moot. If that was so, it would appear to be con-
trary to Funair, where the court modified the SPO only because there was no evi-
dence that any confidential information was not returned to each party pursuant to
the SPO after the arbitration. Thus, in Funair there was no possibility that the
third-party seeking access to the documents would obtain confidential informa-
tion, resulting in the SPO being breached.' '3 If this same analysis were used by
the court in Gotham Holdings, the court may have reached a different conclusion,
as there was evidence that a party did not follow the SPO, at least that is what
Health Grades claimed.l14 Thus, there was a risk that the material sought by Go-
tham Holdings could contain confidential information protected by the SPO.
B. There Is a Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration
Further, it grabs one's attention that the court emphatically denied any sug-
gestion that there is a federal policy favoring arbitration." 5 Numerous courts have
explicitly stated that there is such a policy. The Supreme Court specifically stated
in Moses H. Cone "that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
108. Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d. at 665-66.
109. Id. at 665.
110. Id. at 666.
111. Opening Brief and Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant, Health Grades, Inc.,
Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d 664 (2009) (No. 09-2377), 2009 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 186, at *11-
*12.
112. Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d at 665-66.
113. Malibu Consulting Corp. v. Funair Corp., No. SA-06-CV-735-XR, 2007 WL 173668, at *5
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2007).
114. Gotham Holdings, 2009 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 186, at * 11-*12.
115. Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d at 666.
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regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.""'6 Further, the Court noted that
the FAA provided that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration."" 7
In particular, the court in Cunningham Lindsey noted that "protecting confi-
dentiality agreements ... promotes federal policy and encourages ADR by ensur-
ing that parties in an arbitration proceeding get the protection for which they con-
tracted." 118 However, the court warned that "[a]n overzealous" support of ADR
may result in the suppression of otherwise admissible evidence solely for the
cause of confidentiality.'19 Along with the federal policy favoring confidentiality,
there is also "a countervailing public and private interest" in allowing a party the
opportunity to obtain relevant information needed to support its argument.120
Regardless of whether the court denied the existence of a federal policy favor-
ing arbitration, the court was correct in recognizing the key feature of that policy
by stating that such a policy is merely "to place [arbitration] agreements upon the
same footing as other contracts."'21
Thus, if there is such a policy favoring arbitration, it is merely a policy favor-
ing contracts in general.122 With this policy favoring contracts, the court noted
that it has lon been established that contracts bind only those who sign them, not
third parties.' Furthermore, if confidentiality agreements bound third parties,
arbitration would no longer be viewed as a "necessary legal remedy" if parties
were unable to secure any other evidence or testimony other than their own.124
116. Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see also Arthur
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 192 (2009) ("We have said many times that federal law
requires that "questions of arbitrability ... be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration.").
117. Moses H. Cone, at 24-25; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 ("The effect of [§ 2] is to create a body of federal
substantive law of arbitrability.").
118. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cunningham Lindsey Claims Mgmt., Inc., No. 03CV0531 (DLI
(MLO), 03CV1625 (DLI) (MLO), 2005 WL 1522783, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005) (mem.). Such
federal policy, created by the ADR Act of 1998 and the FAA, is in favor of ADR, and in particular
arbitration. Id.
119. Id. (citing Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D. Nev. 1993)).
120. Id. (citing Hasbrouck v. America Hous. Servs., 187 F.R.D. 453, 459 (N.D.N.Y. 1999)).
121. Gotham Holdings v. LP v. Health Grades, Inc., 580 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Arthur
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1901 (2009)).
122. Id
123. Id. at 665 ("No one can 'agree' with someone else that a stranger's resort to discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be cut off."); see also Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbot Lab., 297 F.3d
544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002); Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 854 (7th Cir. 1994),
rev'g, 143 F.R.D. 657 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
124. Teamsters Nat'l Auto. Transporters Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. Troha, 328 F.3d 325, 330 (7th
Cir. 2003).
A collective bargaining agreement that requires arbitration is powerless if the parties to the arbi-
tration cannot present evidence in the form of third person testimony or possessed by third par-
ties. Enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate cannot provide the "necessary legal remedy" if the
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C. Gotham Holdings Essentially Gives Prior Arbitration Awards Prece-
dential Value
The ruling in Gotham essentially allows a third-party to obtain prior arbitra-
tion awards along with accompanying documents and use that information as
evidence of precedent in the current dispute. In fact, the court did not limit its
ruling solely to those arbitration documents and awards involving the party oppo-
nent. The court simply stated that confidentiality agreements do not bind third
parties, and absent trade-secrets, privileges, or statutes requiring confidentiality,
the prior arbitration documents must be disclosed.'2 5 Such a ruling appears to go
against the ruling in Funair, where the court found that confidential information
specifically protected by the SPO is not discoverable.126 However, like the SPO in
Funair, which exempted non-confidential information, the agreement in Gotham
Holdings specifically exempted information from protection that needed to be
disclosed in order to meet certain "legal or regulatory requirements." 27
Even though the ruling in Gotham Holdings may not have been in conflict
with the reasoning of the Western District of Texas in Funair, such a ruling ap-
pears to directly conflict with the findings of the Fifth Circuit in Iberia. 128 Even
with the Seventh Circuit in Gotham Holdings citing favorably towards Iberia's
ruling that a party to the confidentiality agreement may not voluntarily disclose
such information to a third-party,129 one cannot miss the divergent findings by the
courts in giving prior arbitration awards precedential value. In Iberia, the court
rejected the idea of giving precedential value to arbitration awards, as it found that
parties voluntarily trade the procedures and review of the courts in favor of the
efficiency, informality, and speed of arbitration.13 0
Further, the Fifth Circuit in Arce found that the third-party would not be at a
disadvantage in the subsequent proceeding, as it was still free to prove its case and
would just be in the same position as any other party who was unable to use con-
fidential or privileged information to prove its case.' 3 ' Nonetheless, the court in
Gotham Holdings remained silent on these issues, merely stating that parties to a
confidentiality agreement, absent a privilege, trade-secret, or statute, may only
bind third parties with their consent.132 With there being no privilege, trade-
secret, or statute demanding confidentiality, even to third parties, the court found
the information must be disclosed.133
125. Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d at 665.
126. Malibu Consulting Corp. v. Funair Corp., No. SA-06-CV-735-XR, 2007 WL 173668, at *4
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2007).
127. 580 F.3d at 665.
128. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 159 (5th Cir. 2006).
129. 580 F.3d at 665-66.
130. 379 F.3d at 175-76 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985)).
131. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Arce, 533 F.3d 342, 347 (5th Cir. 2008).
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D. The Need for Probative Evidence Outweighs the Policy Interests in
Arbitration
However, this leads one to ask not only whether giving arbitration awards
precedential value benefits the key advantages1 34 of arbitration, but more broadly,
whether there should be an arbitration privilege, 35 as many states already possess
a mediation privilege.'3 6  In Gotham Holdings, the court cited to University of
Penn. v. EEOC in referencing the fact that the Supreme Court has been reluctant
in recent years in establishing new privileges, as privileges are contrary to the
principle that "the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence."' 3 7 However,
privileges may be necessary if the interests promoted by the privilege "outweigh
the need for probative evidence."' 3 8
In fact, some courts have found that the policy interests' 39 of arbitration out-
weigh the need for any probative evidence, as parties should get the protections
134. The key advantages of arbitration being:
(1) The opportunity to select a decision maker rather than be subject to an inherently suspect jury
process or the whims of a particular judge. (2) Informality of the process. (3) Can set up a sche-
dule based on the parties' needs rather than the court's schedule. (4) Can tailor the proceedings to
the parties' needs. (5) Certainty of dates. (6) The process is quicker and may be substantially
cheaper. (7) The process belongs to the parties and not to the court. (8) The parties can decide
where the hearings will be held and what law should apply. (9) The United States Supreme
Court noted arbitration's benefit compared to litigation, including less expense, simple procedural
and evidence rules, less hostility between parties, less disruption of ongoing and future dealings
among the parties and more flexible scheduling of times and places for hearings and discovery.
(10) One of the most significant benefits of arbitration is the ability of the parties to keep the
process confidential.
ELISE D. BRENNAN & ROBERT L. BRENT, HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK § 2:8 (2006).
135. The fact that arbitration is confidential "does not necessarily create an evidentiary privilege."
Laurie Kratky Dor6, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It's Time to Let Some Sun Shine in on
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 463, 495 (2006). "The ADR Act does not
create any evidentiary privilege." Id. at n.173; see also Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 68 (3d Cir.
2000) ("[s]tatutory provisions providing for duties of confidentiality do not automatically imply the
creation of evidentiary privileges binding on the courts").
136. Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2007) (California statutory mediation privi-
lege); EEOC v. Northlake Foods, Inc., 411 F.Supp.2d 1366 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (local rule); FDIC v.
White, 76 F.Supp.2d 736 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (Texas statutory privilege); New Horizon Fin. Servs., LLC.
v. First Fin. Equities, Inc., 278 F.Supp.2d 259 (Dist. Conn. 2003) (Connecticut statutory privilege);
U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Dick Corp./Barton Malow, 215 F.R.D. 503 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (Pennsylva-
nia statutory mediation privilege). Notwithstanding various state laws, federal law does not recognize
a mediation privilege. Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661 (N.D. Tex. 1994). "Laws and administrative
rules generally protect confidentiality of non-binding processes because it promotes candor, and there-
fore efficacy, of these processes." Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54
U. KAN. L. REv. 1211, 1239 (2006).
137. Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d at 666; see also Univ. of Penn v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990).
"We do not create and apply an evidentiary privilege unless it 'promotes sufficiently important inter-
ests to outweigh the need for probative evidence . . . any privilege must 'be strictly construed."' Id.
(quoting Trammel v. U.S., 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
138. Univ. ofPenn, 493 U.S. at 189.
139. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cunningham Lindsey Claims Mgmt., Inc., No. 03CV0531 (DLI
(MLO), 03CV1625 (DLI) (MLO), 2005 WL 1522783, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005) (mem.) (citing
Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) ("There are important policy inter-
est[s] involved in protecting the expectations of confidentiality belonging to parties who have chosen
an alternative means of dispute resolution."). "Federal policy, as evidenced by the enactment of the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 and the Federal Arbitration Act, favors alternative dispute
476 [Vol. 2010
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for which they bargained.14 0  Even in Baxter Int'l., where the Seventh Circuit
determined that confidentiality agreements signed as part of an overall settlement
agreement in litigation did not extend to the prying eyes of third parties, the court
stated that the path of complete confidentiality is that of arbitration. 14 1 Further-
more, courts have found the appeal of arbitration has traditionally been its sim-
plicity, informality, speed, and cost-effectiveness. 142 If third parties start demand-
ing the procedures associated with courts, i.e., giving prior arbitral awards prece-
dential value, then arbitration would become indistinguishable from litigation,
thus destroying its appeal.143
Nonetheless, this reasoning for not allowing certain procedures, such as not
permitting third parties to obtain relevant prior arbitrations awards and documents,
is misguided. As the court noted in Jaffe, allowing such information to be disco-
verable would actually make arbitration cheaper, quicker, easier, and more effi-
cient, because money would not have to be spent on wasteful, duplicative discov-
ery. '" Furthermore, unlike judicial review, another proposed procedure that has
been attacked in recent years, the resolution of the dispute would not drag on,
creating further expense.145 In fact, such relevant information may aid the arbitra-
tor in reaching a quicker decision, thus shortening the dispute resolution process.
Additionally, as arbitrators are generally paid by the hour or by the day,146 such
expedited decision-making would lead to lower costs.
However, what is the result when something such as subpoenas issued during
arbitration and the disclosure of prior arbitration awards and documents, which
most likely would lead to quicker, cheaper, and more efficient resolutions, clashes
with the longstanding idea that arbitration lacks certain procedures so as to assure
that it remains cost-effective? Those involved must decide whether it is the lack
of procedure and informality that is the hallmark of arbitration or whether it is
arbitration's cost-effectiveness. And whether anything that makes arbitration
more cost-effective should be implemented, or whether there is an ideal medium
where arbitration remains efficient but adopts certain legal procedures to assure
resolution ("ADR"), and particularly arbitration." Id. (citing JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387
F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir. 2004)).
140. Cunningham Lindsey, 2005 WL 1522783 at *3 ("[P]rotecting confidentiality agreements ...
promotes federal policy and encourages ADR by ensuring that parties in an arbitration proceeding get
the protections for which they contracted.").
141. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbot Lab., 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002).
142. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995).
143. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175-76; see Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 280; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985).
144. Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. Civ. A. 04 N-1228 (CBS, 04-x-
0057), 2004 WL 1821968, at *2 (Dist. Colo. Aug. 13, 2004).
145. See Hall Street Assocs. LLC. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (holding there is no general
review for legal error but that §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA provide the sole grounds under federal law for
review, which may be expanded upon by state statutory or common law). "Any other reading opens
the door to the full-bore legal and evidentiary appeals that can 'rende[r] informal arbitration merely a
prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process . . . .' Id. at 588 (citing
Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache T Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (2003)).
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that it remains an effective legal remedy.147 Arbitration has long been heralded
for its informality and its simplicity-would allowing third parties access to prior
arbitration awards and documents really do away with the appeal, the speed, and
the cost-effectiveness?
VI. CONCLUSION
The court in Gotham Holdings was correct to hold that the SPO entered into
between Health Grades and Hewitt did not prevent Gotham Holdings from obtain-
ing the arbitration documents, as the SPO clearly stated that those documents may
be disclosed to meet certain legal or regulatory requirements. 148 This ruling essen-
tially gives third parties the opportunity to obtain prior arbitration awards and use
them as evidence of precedent in a subsequent arbitral or judicial proceeding.
Additionally, any concern that arbitration will lose its appeal, as such a procedure
will drive up the cost of arbitration and make arbitration too much like litigation,
is unwarranted. Providing prior arbitration awards with precedential value will
only lead to a quicker and more cost-efficient process. Likewise, allowing parties
to seek evidence and testimony other than their own, will allow parties to provide
better support for their claims and permit arbitration to become an even more
"necessary legal remedy." 4 9
MATTHEW GIERSE
147. Mitchell A. Orpett, A Practical Comparison ofArbitration, Mediation and Litigation ofReinsur-
ance Disputes-Publicity and Precedential Value, in 3 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE
LMGATION § 41:77 (David Leitner et al. eds., 2009).
148. Opening Brief and Required Short Appendix of Defendant-Appellant, Health Grades, Inc.,
Gotham Holdings, 580 F.3d 664 (2009) (No. 09-2377), 2009 U.S. 7th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 186, at *10.
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